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Introduction 
The notion of the ‘societal effect’, as posited by the LEST School (Maurice et al, 1986) has long 
represented a bulwark against universalist thinking within research into labour markets, the wider 
structuration of the wage-employment relationship, and organisation studies. 
The specific methodological commitments of the LEST school itself (see the appendices to Maurice et al, 
1986) are perhaps more honoured in the breach than in the observance. However, the underpinning 
idea of the importance of integrating “the comparison and analysis of the genesis and dynamics of 
institutional forms, social rules, policies and cultures” (Michon, 1992: 223) into an analysis of economic 
systems has inspired a broad comparative literature on the organisation of capitalism (Lane, 1989; 
Whitley, 1992, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). This broader literature is sometimes referred to as ‘societal 
institutionalism’ (Djelic and Quack, 2003). When applied to labour market organisation, this stresses the 
idea that labour supply and demand are the result, not of the application of abstract economic norms, 
but of mutually interlocking spheres of social structuring of the opportunities and constraints facing 
work organisations and workers (see Rubery 1992). 
Essentially, societal institutionalism argues that capitalism is embedded at a national-societal level in 
mutually-reinforcing and interlocking ‘spheres’ of political economy, in ways which create national 
‘logics’ of employment relations, labour market construction and production organisation which 
combine to create a certain degree of internal coherence. As we will reflect on below, in contemporary 
societal institutionalist work there are different degrees of insistence on, or questioning of, the national 
closure of such logics, and implicitly on the long-controversial concept of ‘coherence’, and how far this 
implies functionality (Rubery 1992; Maurice and Sorge, 2000). However, this embeddedness, or process 
of institutionalised social construction, is a necessary feature of the complex socio-economic relations 
involved in the reproduction of capitalism within specific political-geographical spaces, rather than being 
only a feature of those societies which depart more obviously from liberal norms of the employment 
relationship. Thus, “the notion of juxtaposing a labour market structured by institutions and a 
deregulated labour market structured by market forces is invalid. If explicit labour market regulations 
are dismantled then the labour market will be exposed to the influences of firm-specific employment 
policies on the one hand and the institutions of social reproduction on the other, with no regulatory 
systems or norms to restrict the extent of inequality or segmentation” (Rubery, 1992: 258). 
Methodologically, societal institutionalism was originally developed in conscious opposition to 
approaches, often based in forms of contingency theory, which try to draw relations between variables 
in all national environments, “posing the existence of a rationality above and beyond national specifics 
and cultural particularities” (Maurice et al, 1979: 43). Maurice and colleagues were referring to research 
using contingencies drawn from organisational theory (Lammers and Hickson, 1979), such as markets, 
technology and size. However it is also the case that a fairly large volume of cross-sectional international 
research, often based on statistical comparisons of a large number of countries, uses indicators of more 
macro-level economic, social and political characteristics.  
The debate between formal contingency approaches and internationally comparative methods no 
longer has the prominence it once did (see the various contributions to Lammers and Hickson, 1979). In 
practice, however, a very considerable volume of international research follows the precepts of 
comparing standard variables, divorced from their socio-political-cultural contexts, in making 
statements about differences in outcomes at national level. These ‘thin’ forms of comparison are 
favoured by the political economy of research, in particular through the frequent need for research to 
cover large numbers of countries due to funder requirements, and the incentives to make positivistic 
claims about the relations between variables across as large an n of countries as possible. 
Societal institutionalism rejects such cross-sectional analysis, at least as the sole form of comparative 
research. Instead it argues that analysis of labour market construction, or of organisational decision-
making, must be predicated on an understanding of how the dependent variable(s) of interest are 
socially constructed through the interplay of a large range of forces, or societal ‘spheres’, which interact 
together in mutually co-constitutive ways. For the original LEST research of Maurice and colleagues, a 
comparison of internal labour markets in industrial firms in France and Germany required an analysis of 
the mutual co-constitution of the educational and vocational training system, the nature of business 
organisation, and the structure of employer-worker struggle in the industrial relations structure. For 
societal analysis, it is essential to analyse how these ‘spheres’ are constructed in different societies, and 
how they relate to each other; the best research in this tradition goes beyond positing institutional 
logics, and attempts to understand the socialised rationality of actors (see the methodological appendix 
to Maurice et al, 1986).  
Rubery’s work provides an illustration of how such a methodology might proceed, which is worth 
quoting at length; “According to the LEST school, it is in fact crucial to understand the articulation of 
social and economic organisation within a given society and not seek to find universal patterns between 
societies through cross-sectional analysis. Apparently similar forms of economic or social organisation 
may in fact serve very different functions within different societies. To take part-time employment as an 
example, before it can be determined what role part-time work plays in absorbing surplus labour in 
recessions…, it is necessary to undertake a detailed analysis of, amongst other factors, the share of the 
informal economy, the overall participation rates, the measured level of unemployment, the family 
division of labour and hours of work for full-timers, and the role of part-time work in the productive 
system. In short the relative importance of the role of part-time work in disguising unemployment 
cannot be simply read off from a comparison of the shares of part-time work between societies” 
(Rubery, 1992). 
Societal institutionalist literature outside the original LEST school, and other comparative frameworks 
strongly influenced by the LEST principles of comparison, are often interested in different ‘spheres’ and 
‘interlockages’. Indeed, societal institutionalist research needs to be wary of concretising the 
explanatory factors that it investigates too strictly, as ‘deep’ comparativism can only achieve its 
objectives to the extent that the researcher is confident of having understood the relevant 
interdependencies and interconnections between all the different spheres of social space which shape 
his/her particular area of interest. These are likely to change if the research focus changes, and may also 
vary themselves across societies. Thus while the spheres elucidated by the LEST school, Whitley, Hall 
and Soskice and others are helpful as a guide, for a given concrete piece of research the relevant 
‘spheres’ and their ‘interlockages’ can only really be discovered inductively, and may emerge in a 
relatively ad-hoc way in the research process. For example, in our own comparative research on the 
involvement of social actors in the attraction and retention of foreign direct investment, the structuring 
of territorial politics, and the channelling of populist as opposed to mainstream politics, emerged as key 
co-constitutive variables (Almond et al, forthcoming). Thus, we would argue that the precise labelling of 
spheres is less important than retaining the core idea of a system of interlocking societal spheres 
structuring economic organisation (or for labour market analysis more specifically, labour supply and 
demand). 
Challenges for societal institutionalist analysis 
Sympathetic critics of societal institutionalism have tended to focus on the somewhat functionalist 
approach of the LEST school (exacerbated, we would argue, in some subsequent work influenced by it, 
particularly the Varieties of Capitalism approach, see Almond and Gonzalez, 2006), and consequent 
difficulties in developing “a dynamic analysis of change in societal organisation, as change usually arises 
out of conflict and tension and not out of harmony and complementarity” (Rubery, 1992: 248). 
Somewhat relatedly, sympathisers and critics alike have questioned the merits of defending specifically 
national-societal embeddedness, in the context of international integration over the last thirty years. 
Part of the problem in analysing change arises if the notions of ‘coherence’ and societal ‘logics’ are taken 
to mean that it is necessary to boil societal effects down into underpinning guiding forces of national 
capitalisms.  This is a frequent but in our view non-necessary component of societal institutionalist 
research – it should be possible to trace the mutual interactions of conflicts and power struggles in 
different spheres of society, and identify the logics these interactions embody, without positing that 
these interlockages provide path-dependencies that are necessary ‘coherent’ in the sense of being 
functional (see Rubery, 1994 on the UK productive system). Indeed, the recent trend towards a more 
actor-centred institutionalism analysing the role of actors in changing institutions (e.g. Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005) is strongly affected by societal institutionalism, at the same time as questioning the 
national stability of societal systems as regulatory forces under neo-liberal globalisation.   
 Equally, it is clearly the case that any sort of ‘coherence’ of national-societal systems is predicated on 
some sort of coherence with the demands of international political economy and globalising capitalism. 
To be practically adequate, comparative analysis needs both to take systematic account of the selective 
‘efficiency’ of societies as informed by processes of international integration (Rubery, 1992; Wilkinson, 
1983), and to recognise that these processes imply that institutional embeddedness is not exclusively at 
the national level. This means taking into more systematic account sectoral and sub-national variations 
(Rubery 1992: 248), as well as supranational or transnational structuration. 
The remainder of this chapter revisits some of these challenges, in the context of the 
transnationalisation of productive capital, and the dynamics of regime competition that have ensued at 
national and more local levels. We argue that it is important to retain an emphasis on the mutual 
interdependencies shaping the social construction of labour markets, while giving greater emphasis to 
the ways that, within ‘variegated’ neo-liberal capitalism (Peck and Theodore, 2007), the dynamics of 
competitiveness both depend on, but also challenge, relatively coherent ‘societal’ fixes as to the nature 
of socio-productive systems.  
International competition and societal effects 
At one level, specific factors causing increased international competition for production can readily be 
identified: the more systematic incorporation of large parts of the Global South into global circuits of 
capital, trade liberalisation at continental and transnational levels, the financialisation of the firm, and 
the variety of ways in which technology and product market liberalisation have enabled markets to be 
serviced remotely and enabled more accurate surveillance of the international operations of 
multinational firms. 
Notwithstanding current nationalist-populist challenges, these factors are related to a broad shift in the 
emphases of national governments, from the protection and development of national productive 
capitalisms to securing positions in international contests for mobile investment (Jessop, 2004). 
Countries – but also cities, sub-national regions, and to an extent supranational trade blocs – engage in 
competition to attract private-sector investment. More broadly, policy decisions are inflected by efforts 
to develop or maintain international or global ‘competitiveness’ (Pedersen, 2010), influenced not only 
by flows of capital but also by the active agency of transnational regulators. In other words, the 
contemporary international organisation of production and the nature of state regulation are intricately 
intertwined: the state, at regional, national and supranational levels, has been and remains a 
constitutive actor in enabling and reproducing patterns of international competition, through active 
processes of re-regulation, both of product markets and of factors of production, including labour 
(Cerny, 1997; Jessop 2013).  
Where does this leave societal-level analysis? One stock answer to the challenges of globalisation for 
societal institutionalists has been to posit some form of comparative institutional advantage, such that 
the nature of coordination used in a national economy will present it with certain advantages in specific 
types of production (Sorge, 1991). Thus, Germany and the other densely-institutionalised economies 
labelled by Varieties of Capitalism analysts as ‘coordinated market economies’ have advantages in 
sectors where progress is built upon incremental improvements in engineering, requiring collaborative 
relationships between employers and highly competent, adaptable employees, aided by patient capital. 
But despite the continued popularity of the varieties of capitalism argument as a device for labelling 
national economies, Hall and Soskice’s (2001) vision of globalisation leading to a relatively benign 
process of nations building upon their path-dependent institutionalised strengths seems over-optimistic, 
given the extent to which liberalising pressures have been felt even in the core ‘coordinated market 
economies’ such as Germany (Holst, 2013), and the broader difficulties faced in persuading individual 
firms to tolerate ‘constraints’, even if their effects are acknowledged to be beneficial at an aggregate, 
national level (Marsden, 2015). In other words, the globalisation of capital makes free-riding by firms 
very much easier in weakening any notion of solidarity within national capitalisms. The locational 
flexibility of important fractions of productive capital is a key factor here. 
Multinationals, regime shopping, resource shopping and societal effects 
It is important to take explicit account of the fact that multinational companies (MNCs) can, to greater 
or lesser extents, choose where to locate. ‘Regime-shopping’ (Streeck, 1991) has many different aspects, 
including notably fiscal and labour regulation. Following societal institutionalism, we would argue that 
favourable forms of societal-institutional embeddedness (e.g. skills institutions with favourable outputs 
etc.) as well as the local-national availability of particular forms of extra-firm coordination (e.g. access to 
innovation networks, relations with local firms, etc) are one set of forces structuring MNC choices about 
location. 
If different societal-institutional complexes create possibilities for competitive advantage in specific 
fields of activity, then a certain degree of self-selection is likely to take place as to which types of foreign 
direct investor have significant presence in which types of national business system. If this argument 
holds, then how MNCs behave in terms of their interactions with host-domestic institutions, and the 
degree of compatibility between the supply of, and demand for, specific forms of institutional resources, 
are likely to operate substantially differently between different types of national economy. Thus, in this 
case, regime shopping by MNCs may reinforce national and local institutional complementarities, and 
contribute to divergence between business systems in different locations, as represented in Hall and 
Soskice’s (2001) discussion of globalisation as a relatively benign force, at least for coordinated and 
liberal market economies. 
Alternatively, if international market and politics pressures on societies to follow uniform means of 
competing for productive investment are strong enough to disturb fundamentally the socio-economic 
foundations of host institutions, then patterns of firm coordination within MNCs may move back more 
within the hierarchy of the global firm itself, and its dependent supplier networks. Given evidence of the 
important role of the state and of socio-historically contingent institutions in promoting innovation 
(Crouch, 2005), such a development would be unlikely to have positive consequences even if our only 
interest were in the promotion of exportable innovation. Such a vision would also have negative 
implications for visions of MNCs as leading local economic development in ways that produce positive-
sum games with localized productive systems, as positive spillover effects from MNCs to host economies 
would be more limited. 
In seeking the reality between these alternate binary positions, it is important also to disaggregate the 
multinational itself (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2011). To a societal institutionalist, societal systems 
provide the resources allowing firms to compete, and do so in different ways in different types of 
business systems. For an MNC which has choices about location, each host business system is to some 
extent a ‘supplier of embeddedness’, operating in competition with systems elsewhere. However, to 
managers of a particular subsidiary unit, the specific host business system is the only one available. This 
may mean that managerial interest in attempts to create productive links in host economies differs 
between different levels of the international firm – local managers may have powerful incentives to find 
ways of collaborating with other local actors to achieve productivity, financial or other targets, even if 
corporate actors have little interest. Where regime competition is particularly intense, as for example in 
the automobile industry, the places that are successful in attracting new investment often benefit from 
tight networks between the local/national state, development agencies, and labour market institutional 
actors (Hudson, 2002). In such cases, regime competition and insecurity of future investment may lead 
to greater, rather than lesser, degrees of associational/network ‘embeddedness’ with these non-firm 
actors, at the same time as co-opting local institutions to the vagaries of international competition. 
These processes of ongoing competition for productive investment have been extensively researched by 
a literature on global production networks (GPN) (see Coe and Yeung, 2015), which gives analytical 
priority to how lead firms coordinate international production through relations with a wide range of 
actors. These include dependent firms, the state at various geographical levels, education, training and 
research infrastructures, and a wide range of associational actors, including employers’ associations and 
trade unions. It therefore attempts to locate an analysis of the roles of such actors within geographically 
and organisation ‘fragmented’ (Herrigel and Zeitlin, 2010), yet still actively coordinated, international 
networks of the production and exploitation of value.  
Importantly, for GPN scholars, the strategies regional actors must take to develop favourable positions 
in global production networks go beyond the more established notions of ‘comparative institutional 
advantage’ often found in the comparative capitalisms literature. In other words, while comparative 
institutionalists often posit relatively ‘static’ forms of comparative advantage, work on global production 
networks sees the relationship between regions and firms as a more dynamic relationship of ‘coupling’ 
(Coe et al, 2004). This core concept implies that there is, or needs to be, a continual process of 
adaptation of ‘host’ human and other resources to the constantly evolving needs of firms within global 
production networks. These processes of adaptation are not limited to occasional institutional reforms: 
rather, they refer to continual, mutually adaptive, relations between international firms and 
geographically embedded state and other governance actors. 
In arguing for an explicit consideration of how regional actors activate networks in order to respond to 
the demands of international competition, the GPN literature builds upon, and extends, earlier 
arguments within regional studies and economic geography that the global fragmentation of production 
was likely to cause the local network embeddedness of the subsidiary operations of MNCs to increase 
(e.g. Morgan, 1997). Routine branch plants, serving national markets and operating to well-established 
corporate production methods, could often function with limited interactions with local business system 
actors. However, where lead firms develop the capacity to make fine-grained decisions about the 
geographical and organisational location of their activities, subsidiary units increasingly compete to 
exercise functions, or ‘mandates’ on an international basis (Birkinshaw, 1996), which may be global or at 
the level of the supranational ‘region’. Units which are unsuccessful in these contests are increasingly 
marginalised, and threatened in cases where access to markets no longer requires the existence of 
local/national ‘branches’. 
Clearly, the fact that much productive investment is mobile makes it much more difficult for regional 
governments, businesses, employees and trade unions to reach long-term relationships with inward 
investors. However, this marked shift in the balance of power does not mean that the role of host 
institutions has been reduced to a simple avoidance of ‘constraints’. Rather, host institutions have been 
repurposed to at least some extent, as the attraction and retention of the investment and jobs 
associated with the high value-added components of global production networks requires that regional 
and national actors seek, through the agency of their business system actors, to provide embedded 
resources. 
Societal institutionalism and multinational companies 
Although research in the coordination of MNC subsidiaries often argues that international firms need to 
develop local (network) embeddedness (eg Andersson et al, 2002) this works shows, for the most part, 
very limited interest in the wider social contexts which underpin the extent and type of network 
relations which an MNC might pursue. It therefore largely ignores the structures of incentives and 
constraints which shape the ability and willingness of MNCs and of local network actors to participate in 
the relations of trust and mutual obligation which it focuses on. If it is true that “a unit’s most important 
resource is the web of specific relationships in which the subsidiary is embedded” (Anderson and 
Forsgren, 1996: 487), then it is vital, particularly for comparative and policy-oriented research, to take 
much more serious account of an array of research which indicates that national business and 
innovation systems differ from each other in non-trivial ways, even between countries of comparable 
wealth and development (Lundvall, ed., 2010), and that sophisticated MNCs are capable of taking these 
differences into account when deciding where to locate different types of activities (Cantwell and 
Iammarino, 2000). It is here that societal institutionalist research can make a key contribution. 
The societal institutionalist view has frequently been deployed in the human resource management and 
organisational studies literatures in order to investigate the multiple embeddedness of MNCs in 
different national structures for the coordination of capitalism (Bélanger et al, 2013; Dorrenbacher and 
Geppert, 2011). There is a substantial literature on how MNC capabilities and behaviours are affected by 
elements of the socio-economic structure of their countries of origin; whether MNCs “attempt to take 
with them and apply their own, nationally idiosyncratic, repertoire of HRM practices to their subsidiaries 
in foreign countries” (Gooderham et al 2006: 1507). Equally, there is a wide range of research examining 
the influences of societal effects on the management of MNC host units (Parry et al, 2008; Saka-Helmout 
and Geppert, 2011; Belizón et al, 2013).  
Host societal embeddedness is sometimes viewed as causing constraints: societal effects, whether in the 
form of concrete institutions, or more diffuse artefacts of culture or ideology, may impede MNCs in 
attempts to achieve commonalities of organisational policies across their international operations (e.g. 
Myloni et al, 2004). However, while these may be constraints from the perspective of corporate HQ 
managers, they may present opportunities for subsidiary-level managers, who may derive power 
resources from their ability to interpret local host environments and the limitations and possibilities 
these raise for corporate action. Possessing this institutional understanding, and being able to apply it in 
the context of the MNC, is likely to complement the potential relational advantages of host managers 
being embedded in the host environment. As argued above, however, and particularly given regime 
competition, host-country institutions do not only provide MNCs with constraints (indeed, if they did, 
there would be much less FDI), and rather more focus should be placed on both (relatively) static 
comparative institutional advantage and on more dynamic patterns of relational or network 
embeddedness in MNCs’ interactions with host societies. 
Thus while societal institutionalist literature on MNC has predominantly concentrated on firms’ internal 
management structures and processes, it also argues that firms’ embeddedness in national institutions 
is likely to have implications for how they coordinate relations with external actors (Morgan, 2001). The 
ability of subsidiary-level actors to network usefully in their host environments cannot be assumed. 
Neither is it simply a question of good management. Rather, the capacity to establish embedded 
patterns of relations is shaped by the nature of local and national institutions (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 
2005): what host economy actors may contribute to the capacity of the MNC unit to compete 
internationally, and how national and local patterns of relations of trust and authority operate, both 
between different firms, and more broadly between firms, labour, the state and civil society 
organisations.  
Logically, firms are more likely voluntarily to engage in external relations, and therefore have a more 
active effect on the performativity of local institutions, the more there are actors within the host 
context with whom there is demonstrable value-added in coordinating. These may include, for example, 
supplier and other related firms who have the capacity to engage with MNCs in relational contracting, or 
institutional actors, such as labour market system actors capable of providing, or co-producing, local 
human resource advantages. Such relations, perhaps particularly those with institutional actors, are 
more likely to operate successfully where host institutions empower actors to engage in localized 
innovation (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Gertler et al, 2000). This includes institutional innovation, or 
what has sometimes been termed ‘experimentation’, where social actors develop the capacities and 
capabilities necessary to allow interactions on a flexible basis without threatening the stability of the 
overall institutional architecture (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). 
The capacity of firm and non-firm actors to engage in long-term coordination is, of course, a core 
concern of societal institutionalism. A simplistic interpretation of work in this tradition tends to argue 
that non-market, long-term, trust-based relations are of more importance in ‘coordinated market 
economies’ such as Germany or Japan, as opposed to the market and hierarchy-centred creation and 
exploitation of resources in more liberal economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). However, there is obvious 
evidence of relational coordination in liberal economies: one need only think of well-known clusters of 
activity such as Silicon Valley, or life sciences around Cambridge, UK, to see examples of firms in such 
economies behaving in decidedly ‘coordinated’, or at least networked, ways (Crouch, 2005). Such cases 
may be exceptions to the national rule, explained by local or sectoral specificities, or by the importance 
of state institutions in embedding activities in strategically important sectors. However, they 
nonetheless point to the need for a granular analysis of how national social structure shapes patterns of 
firm coordination. 
Equally, and importantly insofar as a discussion on societal institutionalism is concerned, the 
institutionalized patterns of transactions said to favour high-trust patterns of ‘relational embeddedness’ 
in countries such as Germany or Japan were developed historically with domestic firms (and the core 
industrial labour force) as key stakeholders, not foreign MNCs. There is insufficient systemic empirical 
evidence as to the extent to which foreign MNCs voluntarily engage in such forms of embeddedness in 
the most ‘coordinated market’ economies. Theoretically, though, it may well be possible for inward 
investors to obtain at least some of the institutionalized advantages such countries are often argued to 
present – such as high-skilled, adaptable workforces – through free-riding. There are certainly some 
signs of this in economies with intermediate levels of coordination (Almond et al, 2014). 
Finally, any comparative analysis in this area needs to get a much clearer picture of what happens when 
host institutions are seen as inadequate. If slotting into existing host-economy patterns of coordination 
is inadequate for the needs of the MNC, then at least two possibilities would seem to be available. On 
the one hand, foreign MNC units might develop fewer voluntary active links with network actors in the 
domestic economy, and rely to a greater extent on their own internal global networks and hierarchies, 
alongside their market power in standard contractual relations. Alternatively, they may choose to 
engage in various forms of institution-building, taking the business of creating frameworks for the 
development of external coordination with local firms, civil society actors and governments into their 
own hands. 
In summary, we would expect patterns of relations to differ across different sorts of host political 
economies. But the picture is almost certainly more complicated than simply positing that the volume of 
external network linkages is greater in one ‘variety of capitalism’ than another. Tracing the nature of 
such potential cross-national differences, and their interactions with standard contingencies such as 
sector, technology, etc., is likely to require an analysis build on the thick description of relational 
networks, and what they mean to the actors concerned. 
On the whole, where the international management literature explores relations between MNC units 
and host economies, it tends implicitly to concentrate on involvement in innovation networks and 
relations with local firms that are assumed to have the potential to result in positive-sum games. Yet it is 
frequently the case that subsidiary units engage with local/national institutions or networks for more 
defensive or tactical reasons. For example, firms which would prefer not to have relations with 
institutions representing collective labour may be required to do so in some host environments. Equally, 
access into some markets requires joint ventures with domestic firms, which the MNC might not have 
chosen freely. Further, host states or localities frequently tie subsidies and other forms of state support 
to the establishment of links with local firms, universities or other actors. While the latter arrangements 
may be voluntary, they nonetheless represent the host state shaping the ‘market’ for ‘embeddedness’. 
Some of these arrangements may well eventually create outcomes which the MNC unit is able to turn to 
its advantage, and indeed doing so is a key skill in subsidiary management. This does not alter the fact 
that their original impetus, from an MNC perspective, is either tactical or defensive. Unless it results in 
some form of perceived local advantage, ‘involuntary’ relations are particularly liable to being opposed 
by MNCs; this is therefore one of the areas in which MNCs are particularly likely to challenge elements 
of established institutionalised societal systems. 
Global, national and local effects 
As observed above, early societal institutionalism, itself embedded in the relatively solid societal 
arrangements of 1970s/80s France and (West) Germany, was over-confident in stressing that the 
national society (and national sovereign state), was the container of societal effects. It is clear, though, 
that contemporary societal institutionalism cannot depend solely on a vision of relatively contained 
national systems, given that their integrity has been increasingly challenges by transnational influences, 
usually of a neo-liberalising nature. This can very clearly be seen in the productive sphere, not just 
through the international firm per se, but more broadly by the reconfiguration of productive capitalism 
into global production networks. Equally it is very clear that financial systems are strongly 
interdependent, and also that regulatory national sovereignty is conditional, as has been amply 
demonstrated in the course of the crisis in Southern Europe. 
At the same time, when investigating how global productive networks interact with host societies, it is 
clear that many demonstrable ‘societal’ effects which influence the nature of MNCs relations with host 
economies and societies are relatively local in scope. It is also not a coincidence that globalisation has 
increasingly gone hand-in-hand with questioning of the national sovereign state from ‘below’. In some 
of these cases, it is probably relatively uncontroversial to say that ‘sub-national’ societal effects are 
strong enough that specific places merit, for some comparative purposes, somewhat separate 
treatment: Quebec, in some respects, may not appear to have a very ‘Canadian’ variant of capitalist 
governance, for example (Almond et al, 2014).   
Additionally, it has sometimes been argued that the shifts in the functions of economic governance 
actors associated with a focus on international competitiveness have been, or should be, accompanied 
by shifts in the levels of governance. The nation state, in other words, becomes increasingly ‘leaky’ as a 
‘container of governance’ (Brenner et al, 2003). Its coordinating capacities are fragmented, with some 
capacity transferred upwards (e.g. supranational or transnational institutions providing competition 
rules), and some downwards (with sub-national regions or localities charged with developing flexible 
infrastructure, and tailoring to local economic and social needs). Influential ideas on industrial policy, 
not least of which is the current EU institutionalisation of ‘smart specialisation’ through Regional 
Innovation Strategies (RIS3, see European Commission, 2014), provide examples of this: regional 
governments are charged with identifying their potential competitive strengths, and how these might be 
operationalised, in association with producer and user stakeholders. 
Clearly, if nothing else, the political situation of the UK at the time of writing should alert us to the 
danger of teleology with such claims. The balance between geographical levels of governance, and thus 
the resources available to state and other governance actors at sub-national levels, remains heavily 
contingent on national systems of political and economic governance, which themselves differ for 
deeply societally embedded reasons. Nonetheless, societal institutionalist research has to be able to 
accommodate various effective geographical levels of the ‘societal’ construction of capitalism if it is to 
be practically adequate in the contemporary world. 
Concluding remarks 
Societal institutionalist researchers act under an assumption – whether explicit or otherwise – that 
economic activity is always embedded in something (inter alia, a system of property rights, rules about 
corporate governance and financing, rules and less formal norms about the appropriate patterns of 
interaction between firms, social understandings about the rights and responsibilities of workers, etc). It 
is important to be clear that this is ultimately an ontological position. In other words, the assumption of 
embeddedness is not refuted by empirical findings that fail to show national effects in specific cases, or 
indeed, by ‘deregulation’ (Almond and Rubery, 2000). This means that a societal institutionalist can 
either test for the effects of specific institutions at specific geographical levels, or, alternatively, can 
attempt to understand the social and institutional foundations of actor choices, whether or not these lie 
primarily in national-level institutional arrangements. Because of this, as the frameworks governing 
economic activity have become progressively ‘de-nationalised’ as a result of broader changes in global 
political economy (Gilpin, 2011), societal institutionalists increasingly seek influences on patterns of the 
coordination of MNCs that may form at multiple transnational, sectoral and sub-national levels (Morgan, 
2007; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Djelic and Quack, 2010), as well as the more traditional national level. 
But moving the analysis to different geographical levels does not resolve the more basic tension within 
societal institutionalism as to whether embeddedness itself is an assumption (which would mean that 
we could perform institutionalist analysis on the underpinnings of even relatively pure market forms of 
exchange, e.g. Biggart and Beamish, 2003), and an alternative reading, which refers to embeddedness as 
meaning the social arrangements that have historically attempted to make capitalism, and market 
exchange, coherent with the stabilisation of society (Polanyi, 1944). Such arrangements are 
geographically variable, as the varieties of capitalism literature reflects. For example, Hall and Soskice’s 
binary model posits that U.S. and German style capitalism are roughly equally successful economically, 
but that the social compromises that shape them are different, with distinct distributional 
consequences. Equally, they are historically variable; institutionalised systems for the governance of 
capitalism are the crystallisation of contests of power between social actors, and liable to be subject to 
change when they no longer fulfil their economic or their social roles, as judged by powerful 
contemporary actors (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
Corporate globalisation, while clearly not the sole driving factor, has played a significant role in making 
the establishment and maintenance of coherent national business systems more difficult. MNCs, as is 
well known, ‘shop’ between regulatory and fiscal regimes with some alacrity, both when making 
location choices and in ongoing negotiations with host country social and political actors (Kristensen and 
Rocha, 2012). There is also a known problem of ‘cherry picking’ (Geppert and Matten, 2006), where 
firms seek to drink from the well of positive outputs of national business systems – such as highly 
educated workforces – while seeking to abstain from contributing to the other components of these 
systems (e.g. welfare states, employment relations regimes) that have been central to the construction 
of these advantages. Additionally, MNCs are, collectively and often individually, powerful actors, with de 
facto and sometimes de jure negotiating power over the nature of many of the social compromises on 
which liberal and social democratic variants of capitalism are built, at least in so far as how these 
arrangements apply to them. In this context, it is important that a comparative institutionalist approach 
to transnational capitalism also interrogates societal embeddedness in its original Polanyian sense of the 
overall coherence of the means of organising the economy within society (Polanyi, 1944). Societal 
institutionalist research, if pursued in a geographically open and actor-sensitive manner, can make a key 
contribution to this endeavour by accessing the relations between societal spheres and their 
interlockages. 
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